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WHO DECIDES CLASS ARBITRABILITY?: THE VANISHING
CLASS ACTION MECHANISM’S LAST STAND
Alexander Corson*
I. INTRODUCTION
The class action and arbitration mechanisms are locked in an
antagonistic relationship. As the prevalence of one expands, the other
shrinks. Over the past few decades, the use and enforcement of arbitration
agreements has dramatically increased while class actions have all but
vanished in certain contexts.1 A series of Supreme Court decisions since
the 1990s have vigorously protected a “national policy favoring
arbitration”2 while simultaneously dismantling the class action. Since
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,3 parties to a contract have largely been able
to immunize themselves from class proceedings by including class action
waivers in their standard arbitration agreements. Class action proponents
have been unable to circumvent this limitation.
The Supreme Court has rejected arguments that class action waivers
contained within arbitration agreements are unconscionable4 or in violation
of another federal law.5 Additionally, arbitration agreements need not
explicitly waive class proceedings so long as they specify that arbitration
shall proceed on an individual basis.6 As a result, arbitration agreements
foreclose class actions except where they contain no class action waiver
and no terms specifying individualized proceedings. But what about
*
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Associate Dean Kristen E. Boon for her guidance and to Professor Charles A. Sullivan for
very helpful comments. Thanks also to Jessica Guarracino, Hannah Levine, Stephanie
Torres, Tatiana Laing, and all the editors of the SETON HALL LAW REVIEW for their
feedback.
1
For a discussion of the prevalence of such agreements in employment contracts, see
Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. POLICY INST.
(Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-mandatory-arbitrationaccess-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-american-workers/
(finding
that the use of arbitration agreements in employment contracts has grown from two percent
in 1991 to over 55 percent in 2017).
2
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
3
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
4
See id. at 341.
5
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
6
See id.
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arbitration agreements that do not expressly waive class proceedings and
are silent as to how they should proceed?
The Supreme Court has made plain that “class arbitration” is
undesirable.7 The majority opinions in both Concepcion and Stolt-Nielsen
v. AnimalFeeds detail the dangers of permitting class arbitration, opining
that arbitration is “poorly suited” to class proceedings.8 This has created a
legal landscape in which courts are loath to interpret general arbitration
agreements as allowing for class arbitration. As such, it is only where the
power of interpretation is vested in an entity other than the courts that class
arbitration can realistically occur. This gives special significance to a
current circuit split over the delegation of these interpretive powers to
arbitrators. The Supreme Court has held that courts shall decide the scope
of arbitration absent “clear and unmistakable” evidence that the parties
have agreed to let an arbitrator make this determination.9 In the context of
bilateral arbitration, a widely accepted method of satisfying this standard is
through the incorporation of a set of arbitration rules granting arbitrators
the power to rule on their own jurisdiction, such as the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) rules.10 Though some courts have refused
to adopt this reasoning11 and certain circuits have limited their holdings,12
“[v]irtually every circuit to have considered the issue has determined that
incorporation of the [AAA] arbitration rules constitutes clear and
unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability.”13
When it comes to class arbitration, however, there is no such
7
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 348 (“class arbitration sacrifices the principal advantage
of arbitration”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
8
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350; Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 686.
9
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); AT&T
Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).
10
See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724 F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013);
Petrofac, Inc. v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 687 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir.
2012); Fallo v. High-Tech Inst., 559 F.3d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 2009); Qualcomm, Inc. v.
Nokia Corp., 466 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmer Ranch LP,
432 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005); Contec Corp. v. Remote Sol. Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208
(2d Cir. 2005).
11
See Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-05682-LH, 2014 WL 2903752, at *11
(N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014); Meadows v. Dickey’s Barbecue Rests., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d
1069, 1078 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Toll Bros., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 417, 428
(E.D. Pa. 2016); Richardson v. Coverall N. Am., Inc., No. 18-532, 2018 WL 4639225, at *4
(D.N.J. 2018).
12
See Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1075 (“We hold that as long as an arbitration agreement is
between sophisticated parties to commercial contracts, those parties shall be expected to
understand that incorporation of the UNCITRAL rules delegates questions of arbitrability to
the arbitrator.”).
13
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 763 (3d Cir.
2016) (quoting Oracle, 724 F.3d at 1074).
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consensus. Some courts draw a hard line between class and bilateral
arbitration when determining whether arbitrability may be delegated.14
Relying on language in Concepcion and Nielsen, the Third Circuit held in
2016 that referencing the AAA rules does not constitute “clear and
unmistakable” evidence that the parties agreed to delegate class
arbitrability to an arbitrator.15 In 2018, the Second Circuit held the
opposite.16 Following the Second Circuit approach, a narrow avenue to
class actions survives. Class actions involving an arbitration agreement
may
proceed
where
that
agreement:
(1) contains no class action waiver; (2) does not specify that it shall
proceed on an individual basis; (3) delegates arbitrability to an arbitrator;
and (4) the arbitrator determines, in his discretion, that proceeding as a
class would be appropriate. Under the Third Circuit approach, this narrow
road evaporates: only those class actions involving no arbitration
agreement will survive. Since arbitration agreements have become
overwhelmingly common in a majority of standard consumer and
employment contracts,17 the path to class actions in these cases has become
so narrow that it may as well not exist at all.
This Comment will focus on the vanishing class action mechanism in
the context of consumer and employment contracts. Part II will examine
foundational Supreme Court jurisprudence that endorsed the use of class
action waivers in arbitration agreements. Part III will explore obstacles to
judicial interpretation of arbitration agreements that would allow for class
arbitration. Part IV will analyze legal and practical considerations relating
to the circuit split over the delegation of class arbitrability. Part V will
offer that the elimination of the class mechanism could have negative
implications both for would-be plaintiffs and defendants before briefly
concluding in Part VI. This Comment assumes that the pervasiveness of
arbitration agreements in standard consumer and employment contracts
will continue to grow and does not discuss the availability of class actions
to claimants in other circumstances.
II. CLASS ACTION WAIVERS
A. Concepcion: The FAA Preempts State Law Barring Class Action
Waivers
Concepcion heralded the beginning of the end for consumer and
employment class actions. The case involved a contract between Vincent
14
15
16
17

See id.
See id. at 766.
See Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 398 (2d Cir. 2018).
Colvin, supra note 1.
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and Liza Concepcion and AT&T for telephone services, which were
advertised to include free phones, but actually included a $30.22 sales tax
fee.18 The Concepcions filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California that was consolidated with a
putative class action alleging fraud and false advertising, among other
things.19 AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration in accordance with
the terms and conditions of its contract with the Concepcions.20 The
district court denied AT&T’s motion, finding the arbitration agreement
unconscionable under California law, following Discover Bank v. Superior
Court,21 because it waived class-wide proceedings.22 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, holding such a rule was not preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).23 The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision, finding the
Discover Bank rule inconsistent with the goals of the FAA.24 Since
Congress’s purpose in enacting the FAA was to ensure arbitration
agreements are enforced by their terms, a state law rule requiring classwide proceedings is in direct conflict because it interferes with the
fundamental attributes of arbitration.25 The result of Concepcion is that
when arbitration and state law clash, arbitration is the victor. But it was not
immediately clear whether this would extend to conflicts between the FAA
and another federal interest.
B. Italian Colors: Federal Law Must Demonstrate a “Contrary
Congressional Command”
The answer came in American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant,26
in which merchants filed a class action antitrust suit against American
Express. The agreement between American Express and the plaintiffs
provided that there would be “no right or authority for any Claims to be
arbitrated on a class action basis.”27 Plaintiffs argued that the court should
not compel arbitration because the costs associated with proving an
antitrust violation would far exceed any individual plaintiff’s recovery,
even after treble damages.28 The district court ordered arbitration and the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that the prohibitive costs rendered the
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337 (2011).
Id.
Id.
113 P.3d 1100, 1108–09 (Cal. 2005).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 338.
Id.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 344.
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
Id. at 231.
Id.
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waiver unenforceable, 29 and declining to follow Concepcion because it
dealt with state-law preemption, unlike the federal antitrust laws at issue.30
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the FAA allowed
courts “to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they do not
permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.”31
The Supreme Court overturned the Second Circuit, finding no
evidence that “the FAA’s mandate ha[d] been ‘overridden by a contrary
congressional command.’”32 The Court noted that the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act make no mention of class actions and declined to extend an
“effective vindication” exception to the FAA which would invalidate
arbitration agreements that adversely impact a party’s right to pursue
statutory remedies.33 The Court cited Concepcion, restating its specific
rejection of an argument that class arbitration is necessary to vindicate all
of the rights at issue.34
Italian Colors extended Concepcion beyond state-law preemption,
demanding a “contrary congressional command” in another federal law to
overcome the FAA’s presumption in favor of arbitration. Such a challenge
was brought in 2018, and the Court was given an opportunity to add clarity
to this standard.
C. Epic Systems: “Concerted Activities” Does Not Include Class
Actions
In Epic Systems v. Lewis,35 the Court faced the question: “[s]hould
employees and employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between
them will be resolved through one-on-one arbitration?”36 Three cases were
consolidated in which employees brought putative class actions claiming
they and others had been misclassified under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA).37 The employers moved to compel arbitration in accordance with
employment agreements that required bilateral arbitration.38 The Plaintiffs

29

Id. at 232.
Id.
31
Id.
32
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 233.
33
Id. at 234–36.
34
Id. at 238.
35
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
36
Id. at 1619.
37
Id. at 1619–20.
38
“This ‘concerted action waiver’ required employees to (1) pursue legal claims
against Ernst & Young exclusively through arbitration and (2) arbitrate only as individuals
and in ‘separate proceedings.’” Morris v. Ernst & Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir.
2016), rev’d sub nom. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and vacated, 894
F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. 2018).
30
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argued that the saving clause of the FAA39 removed the obligation of
arbitration because the agreements violated the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA), which safeguards the rights of employees to “engage in . . .
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection[.]”40 The Ninth Circuit held that agreeing to forgo all
collective actions violated the NLRA.41 The Supreme Court reversed on
the grounds that the saving clause recognized “only defenses that apply to
‘any’ contract.”42 Following its reasoning in Concepcion,43 the Court
rejected the argument that a contract is unenforceable “because it requires
bilateral arbitration”44 since this position “impermissibly disfavors
arbitration.”45 The Court explained that where two federal statutes
apparently conflict, it must “give effect to both.”46 The plaintiffs failed to
carry their burden of showing “a clearly expressed congressional
intention”47 to displace the FAA with the NLRA.48 Epic Systems solidified
the extension of Concepcion in Italian Colors, and indicates that even laws
that purport to protect concerted action will not prevail against the FAA.49
III. CLASS ARBITRABILITY
Concepcion makes clear that there is no right to class proceedings
where they have been expressly waived in an arbitration agreement.50 But
the opinion and its predecessor, Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds,51 also
39

The section provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to
arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction,
or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2018).
40
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018); Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
41
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1620.
42
Id. at 1622.
43
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
44
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1623.
45
Id.
46
See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
47
Id.
48
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1624.
49
As Professor Almendares concludes, Italian Colors and Epic Systems indicate that it
would take an act of Congress to counteract the effect of Concepcion, and “such action
would have to be rather explicit.” Nicholas Almendares, Aggregation and Governance in
Litigation, (Seton Hall Public Law, Working Paper, Aug. 8, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract
=3228873.
50
See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
51
559 U.S. 662 (2010).
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express hostility to class arbitration on the whole.52 Given this, under what
circumstances, if any, can class arbitration occur? An agreement expressly
providing for class arbitration would presumably be valid. But would the
Supreme Court permit class arbitration where an agreement is silent as to
whether it will proceed individually or as a class? The cases examined
below indicate that the Supreme Court would likely answer that question in
the negative.
A. Nielsen: Implicit Agreements to Class Arbitration
Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds is perhaps less important for its holding
than it is for its reasoning. The Court addressed a dispute between StoltNielsen, a shipping company,53 and AnimalFeeds, a customer that relied on
Stolt-Nielsen to deliver its products around the world.54 When StoltNielsen came under investigation for engaging in an illegal price-fixing
conspiracy, AnimalFeeds and other vendors initiated lawsuits.55 The
standard contract used by Stolt-Nielsen contained an arbitration agreement
that made no mention of class arbitration.56 The parties stipulated to
silence on the availability of class arbitration and selected a panel of
arbitrators to resolve the question.57 After hearing arguments and evidence
regarding arbitration customs and usage in maritime trade, the panel
determined that class arbitration was available.58 Stolt-Nielsen sought
judicial review of the panel’s determination.59 The District Court for the
Southern District of New York overturned the decision and was
subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.60
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and found that the arbitration
panel erred in allowing class arbitration.61 The Court held that, where
parties stipulate that a contract is silent as to class arbitrability, they cannot
be compelled to submit to class arbitration.62 Resting its analysis on the
“foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent,” the
Court held that a party may not be bound to class arbitration unless there is
52
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 350; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 686 (2010).
53
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 666.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 667.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 668.
58
Id. at 669.
59
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 669.
60
Id. at 669–70.
61
Id. at 674.
62
Id. at 684.
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a “contractual basis” for concluding that they had “agreed to do so.”63 The
Court rejected the notion that an implicit agreement to class arbitration
could ever exist,64 explaining that class arbitration “changes the nature of
arbitration” such that it cannot be agreed to simply by submitting to
arbitration.65 Dissenting, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that if the parties
had chosen a judicial forum to resolve “any dispute” involving a contract,
class proceedings would undeniably have been available.66
The Court’s holding, while narrow in the sense that it addressed only
situations in which a contract is silent as to class arbitration, has wide
implications on the interpretation of arbitration agreements at large. A few
years later, the Court answered whether an arbitral decision could bind
parties to class arbitration where they did not stipulate to silence.
B. Sutter: Limited Review of Arbitral Decisions
Oxford Health Plans v. Sutter67 similarly involved an appeal of an
arbitrator’s decision to proceed as a class. The parties, unlike in Nielsen,
did not stipulate to silence on the availability of class arbitration and
submitted the question to an arbitrator.68 When the arbitrator determined
that class arbitration was available, Oxford appealed, arguing that the
arbitrator could not have found sufficient evidence of an agreement to class
arbitration.69
The Court first clarified Nielsen, explaining that it
“overturned the arbitral decision [in Nielsen] because it lacked any
contractual basis for ordering class procedures, not because it lacked . . . a
‘sufficient’ one.”70 The Court concluded that, due to the “limited judicial
review” allowed under the FAA, it could not overturn the arbitrator’s
decision where the parties agreed to let an arbitrator decide.71 The Court
emphasized its limited power of review while expressing skepticism that
the parties actually agreed to class arbitration.72 A concurring opinion by
Justice Alito, the author of Nielsen, suggested that the Court could not have

63

Id.
Importantly, Justice Alito’s opinion recognized that parties could implicitly delegate
the question to an arbitrator, but that an arbitrator (and presumably courts) could not answer
that question by finding an agreement to class arbitration implicit in a general agreement to
arbitrate. Id. at 685–86.
65
Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685.
66
Id. at 698.
67
569 U.S. 564 (2013).
68
See id. at 566.
69
Id. 567–68.
70
Id. at 571.
71
Id. at 573.
72
Id. at 568–69.
64
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upheld the arbitrator’s determination on the merits.73 In 2019, however, the
Supreme Court clarified what the FAA requires for a court to decide in
favor of class arbitration.
C. Varela: Implicit Agreements to Class Arbitration
In Lamps Plus v. Varela,74 the Court granted certiorari to answer the
question: “Does the Federal Arbitration Act foreclose a state-law
interpretation of an arbitration agreement that would authorize class
arbitration based solely on general language commonly used in arbitration
agreements?”75 The Ninth Circuit held that a failure to reference class
arbitration is not the “silence” that Nielsen found insufficient to show
agreement.76 The court found the language ambiguous:
At its outset, the Agreement contains a paragraph outlining
Varela’s understanding of the terms in three sweeping phrases.
First, it states Varela’s assent to waiver of “any right I may have
to file a lawsuit or other civil action or proceeding relating to my
employment with the Company.” Second, it includes an
additional waiver by Varela of “any right I may have to resolve
employment disputes through trial by judge or jury.” Third,
“arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil
legal proceedings relating to my employment.”77
The Ninth Circuit determined that two reasonable constructions were
possible, noting the more reasonable interpretation would authorize class
arbitration.78 The Court found that no “interpretive acrobatics” were
necessary to include class proceedings within the meaning of “a lawsuit or
other civil legal proceeding.”79 The Court explained: “[c]lass actions are
certainly one of the means to resolve employment disputes in court. That
arbitration will be ‘in lieu of’ a set of actions that includes class actions can
be reasonably read to allow for class arbitration.”80 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit found that, construing against the drafter in accordance with
73
Sutter, 569 U.S. at 574 (“If we were reviewing the arbitrator’s interpretation of the
contract de novo, we would have little trouble concluding that he improperly inferred ‘[a]n
implicit agreement to authorize class-action arbitration . . . from the fact of the parties’
agreement to arbitrate.’” (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S.
662, 685 (2010)).
74
139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
75
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2018/17-988 (last
visited Feb. 23, 2020).
76
Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 Fed. App’x. 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted,
138 S. Ct. 1697 (2018).
77
Id.
78
Id. at 673.
79
Id. at 672.
80
Id.
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California law, the language met the “contractual basis” standard under
Nielsen.81
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and readily extended Nielsen.
After deferring to the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the agreement was
ambiguous as to class arbitration under California contract law, the Court
held that an ambiguous agreement cannot provide the “necessary
contractual basis” required for compelling class arbitration.82 Relying on
the reasoning of Nielsen, the Court found no meaningful difference
between an ambiguous agreement and a silent agreement.83 The Court
explained that “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent”—and that it had
“emphasized that foundational FAA principle many times.”84 The “crucial
differences” between bilateral and class arbitration set forth in Nielsen
provide “reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to resolve disputes
through classwide arbitration.”85 The Court’s extension of Nielsen to
ambiguous agreements eradicates any possibility that courts might find an
implicit agreement to class arbitration.
IV. DELEGATING CLASS ARBITRABILITY
Taking the Nielsen and Concepcion strands of jurisprudence together,
a series of extremely specific circumstances must arise for a consumer or
employment class action to take place. The Supreme Court has made clear
that courts may not interpret general arbitration agreements as implicitly
authorizing class arbitration. And since drafters generally want to avoid
class proceedings, it is unlikely that an express provision would ever be
found in such agreements. It follows that only in cases where an arbitrator
has authority over this interpretive question could class arbitration come to
pass.86 Thus, when arbitrators are permitted to make this determination is
of critical importance. As discussed in Part I, it is nearly settled law that
incorporation of a set of arbitral rules granting arbitrators the power to rule
on their own jurisdiction constitutes “clear and unmistakable” evidence that
the parties agreed to arbitrate the question of bilateral arbitrability. But
courts disagree as to the efficacy of such incorporations in the case of class
arbitrability, even where class arbitration is contemplated by the
incorporated rules.
81

Id. at 673.
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019).
83
See id. at 1416 (“Like silence, ambiguity does not provide a sufficient basis to
conclude that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to ‘sacrifice[] the principal
advantage of arbitration.’”).
84
Id. at 1415 (internal citations omitted).
85
Id. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
685–86 (2010)).
86
Recalling the limited judicial review dispositive in Sutter.
82

CORSON(DO NOT DELETE)

2020]
A.

4/9/2020 5:34 PM

COMMENT

1105

Reed: The Sixth Circuit Extends Nielsen Pre-Varela

In Reed Elsevier v. Crockett, Craig Crockett sued LexisNexis, a
division of Reed Elsevier, in a putative class action alleging fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and a number of other
theories in connection with a subscription agreement between his former
law firm and the legal-research service provider. 87 LexisNexis filed a
lawsuit in an Ohio district court seeking a declaration that the arbitration
clause in the subscription agreement did not authorize class arbitration.88
The court ruled in favor of LexisNexis and, on appeal, Crockett argued that
an arbitrator, rather than the court, should have decided the issue of class
arbitrability.89 Citing the reasoning of Nielsen and Concepcion, the court
held that the agreement did not demonstrate “clear and unmistakable”
evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate class arbitrability.90 The
arbitration agreement in question provided:
Except as provided below, any controversy, claim or
counterclaim (whether characterized as permissive or
compulsory) arising out of or in connection with this Order
(including any amendment or addenda thereto), whether based
on contract, tort, statute, or other legal theory (including but not
limited to any claim of fraud or misrepresentation) will be
resolved by binding arbitration under this section and the thencurrent Commercial Rules and supervision of the American
Arbitration Association (“AAA”).91
While the court did not directly address an argument that incorporation of
the AAA rules delegated the decision to an arbitrator, it held that the
ambiguous agreement could not wrest the decision from the court, noting
that it failed to make any mention of class arbitration.92 The court
proceeded to conduct its own analysis of the availability of class arbitration
under Nielsen and, relying on the same reasoning ultimately applied in
Varela which foreclosed an implicit agreement, held that class arbitration
was not available.93
B. Chesapeake: The Third Circuit Decides the Incorporation
Question
In Chesapeake Appalachia v. Scout Petroleum, the Third Circuit

87
88
89
90
91
92
93

Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 596 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 596–97.
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id.
Reed, 734 F.3d at 600.
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addressed for the first time whether incorporation of the AAA rules
delegates the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrator. In a dispute
over various oil and gas leases, the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granted Chesapeake an order vacating an
arbitral decision on the grounds that the leases did not “clearly and
unmistakably” delegate the availability of class arbitration to the
arbitrators.94 The relevant arbitration agreement provided:
In the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee
concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, or damages
caused by Lessee’s operations, the resolution of all such disputes
shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the rules of
the American Arbitration Association. All fees and costs
associated with the arbitration shall be borne equally by Lessor
and Lessee.95
The Third Circuit first reviewed the AAA rules, noting they are “couched
in terms of individual or ‘bilateral’ arbitration proceedings” and then
examined the portions that would grant an arbitrator authority to determine
her own jurisdiction.96 The court then examined precedent and explained
that no binding authority required it to follow Reed or its prior decision,
Opalinski, since the question was not presented in either case. 97
Nevertheless, after restating the “contractual basis” holding of
Nielsen,98 the court held that referencing the AAA rules did not delegate
class arbitrability to an arbitrator.99 The court expressed concerns over the
“daisy-chain of cross-references” from the leases to the AAA Commercial
Rules and finally to the AAA Supplementary Rules.100 Concluding that the
daisy-chain was susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, the
court found that “express contractual language unambiguously delegating
the question of [class] arbitrability to the arbitrator[]” was lacking.101 The
court went on to note that, while “[v]irtually every circuit to have
considered the issue has determined that incorporation of the [AAA]
arbitration rules constitutes clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability,”102 “this ‘bilateral arbitration case law’ is
94

Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 748 (3d Cir.

2016).
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 749.
Id. These rules are discussed in more depth infra Part IV.D.1.
Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 757.
Id. at 759.
Id. at 766.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 763 (quoting Opalinski v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 761 F.3d 326, 335 (3rd Cir.

2014)).
102

Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 763 (quoting Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. A.G., 724
F.3d 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013)).
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entitled to relatively little weight in the class arbitrability context.”103
Relying heavily on Nielsen and Concepcion, the court enumerated concerns
over the “serious consequences” of permitting class arbitration.104 These
consequences, it summarized, included:
[(1) a]n arbitrator . . . no longer resolves a single dispute between
the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many
disputes between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of
parties . . . [; (2)] the presumption of privacy and confidentiality
that applies in many bilateral arbitrations [does] not apply in
class arbitrations[,] thus potentially frustrating the parties’
assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate[; (3) t]he arbitrator’s
award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties
as well[; and (4)] the commercial stakes of class-action
arbitration are comparable to those of class-action litigation,
even though the scope of judicial review is much more
limited.105
After concluding that the parties did not delegate the question to an
arbitrator, the court adopted the district court’s analysis and held that class
arbitration was unavailable.106
C. Sappington: The Second Circuit Breaks from Chesapeake
Since Chesapeake, the Eighth Circuit has subsequently joined the
Third Circuit on the delegation issue.107 But in 2018, the Second Circuit
broke from its sister circuits in Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v.
Sappington.108 Sappington concerned unpaid overtime wages under the
FLSA.109 Former employees of Wells Fargo filed a putative class action in
the Southern District of New York despite a broad arbitration agreement in
their employment contracts.110 Wells Fargo petitioned the court to compel
103

Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 764.
Id.
105
Id. (quoting Opalinski, 761 F.3d at 333).
106
Chesapeake, 809 F.3d at 766.
107
See, e.g., Catamaran Corp. v. Towncrest Pharm., 864 F.3d 966, 973 (8th Cir. 2017)
(incorporating the language of Chesapeake).
108
884 F.3d 392 (2d Cir. 2018).
109
Id. at 393–94.
110
Id. at 394. Two agreements were analyzed in Sappington. The agreement relevant
to our discussion provided:
You are agreeing to arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise
between you and Wells Fargo Advisors . . . . [Y]ou agree that any
controversy or dispute . . . shall be submitted for arbitration before the
[Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”)]. If the FINRA does not
accept the controversy . . . [it] shall be submitted for arbitration before the
American Arbitration Association [(“AAA”)] pursuant to its Securities
104
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bilateral arbitration and the court denied their petition, holding that an
arbitrator, not the court, must decide the availability of class arbitration.111
The court noted that the Securities Arbitration Rules were replaced by the
Commercial Arbitration Rules long before the present controversy arose,
and that Rule 7 allows an arbitrator to rule on her own jurisdiction.112
Since the Supplementary Rules include language referencing class
proceedings, the court concluded that the combination of these rules clearly
grants the question of class arbitrability to the arbitrator.113
Undeterred by “bilateral terminology” (i.e. “you and Wells Fargo”)
similar to language the Third Circuit found significant in Chesapeake, the
Second Circuit explained that references to the employee and employer are
to be expected in an employment contract.114 The court declined to join its
sister circuits, and lightly chastised them for ignoring state law in arriving
at their conclusion.115 The court explained that while concerns about the
increased stakes of class arbitration are valid, they do not bear on the
appropriate question.116 The two-step analysis is: “(1) determining whether
the question is one of arbitrability . . . and, if so (2) determining, on a caseby-case basis, whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence of the
parties’ intent to let an arbitrator resolve that question.”117 The court found
that concerns over the impact of class arbitration apply only to the first step
of this analysis and that they should not bleed into the second step.118
Under state law, nothing more than the language of the contract119 was
required to grant the question to an arbitrator.120
Since Sappington, the Eleventh Circuit has joined the Second Circuit,
evaluating an arbitration agreement stating: “Any dispute arising between
[the parties] will be resolved by submission to arbitration in Broward
County, State of Florida in accordance with the rules of the American
Arbitration Association then in effect.”121 The court agreed that this
language sufficiently incorporated the AAA Commercial Rules and

Arbitration Rules, effective May 1, 1993.
Id.
111

Id.
Id. at 397.
113
Id.
114
Sappington, 884 F.3d at 397.
115
Id. at 398.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 398–99.
119
See id. at 394.
120
Sappington, 884 F.3d at 399.
121
Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Maizes, 899 F.3d 1230, 1232 (11th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in
original).
112
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Supplementary Rules and thereby met the clear and unmistakable standard
required to delegate the question of arbitrability to an arbitrator.122 The
court echoed the reasoning of the Second Circuit, explaining that it read
Nielsen to bear only on the question of “whether an agreement allows class
arbitration at all, separate from the issue of who decides the question to
begin with.”123 Soon after, the Tenth Circuit joined the Eleventh and
Second Circuits, similarly finding: “[t]he fundamental differences between
bilateral and classwide arbitration are irrelevant to us at this second stage of
the analysis.”124
D.

Resolving the Circuit Split

The legal issue in the circuit split over the delegation of class
arbitrability is essentially whether the reasoning of Nielsen bears on the
“who decides” question. Did the Third Circuit allow the “crucial
differences” between bilateral and class arbitration emphasized in Nielsen
to improperly impact its reasoning? These differences are arguably
irrelevant, and the Nielsen Court did not face the “who decides” question,
but rather whether the parties had actually consented to class arbitration.
But the Third Circuit extended Nielsen even beyond Varela, decided three
years later, finding that the dangers of class arbitration are so formidable
that arbitrators cannot be trusted with the question of whether the parties
had indeed consented to such class proceedings.125
Further, the Chesapeake decision has a paradoxical effect: standard
arbitration agreements with no mention of class proceedings whatsoever
effectively become class action waivers.126 This is especially unjust since a
hypothetical plaintiff who actually reads the entirety of the AAA rules
would likely assume that they permit class arbitration—because they do.127
The same legal principle that justifies mandating bilateral arbitration in
contracts of adhesion works an injustice upon the prudent party
scrupulously upholding their duty to read. Affirming Sappington would, at
the very least, require drafters to disclaim the unavailability of class actions

122

Id. at 1233–34.
Id. at 1234.
124
Dish Network L.L.C. v. Ray, 900 F.3d 1240, 1247 (10th Cir. 2018).
125
See generally Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746
(3d Cir. 2016).
126
Justice Ginsburg alluded to a similar concern at oral argument in Varela. See Oral
Argument at 18:16, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019) (No. 17-988),
https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/roberts10/oral_argument_audio/24633.
127
In fact, there is an entire set of supplementary rules dedicated to the procedure. See
infra note 132. Any logical person reviewing the AAA rules would never suspect that an
arbitrator could not decide to implement a procedure that had a set of rules created
specifically for that purpose.
123
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in order to absolutely preclude them. The threat of an arbitrator having
leeway to allow class arbitration would presumably motivate parties with
superior bargaining power to be upfront about such limitations instead of
relying on the ambiguity of silence. But history teaches that the just result
and the legal result are not always one and the same.
1. Legal Analysis
The crux of the debate between Chesapeake and Sappington concerns
two competing readings of the Nielsen opinion. The courts agree that the
analysis involves a two-part test, but disagree about whether the skepticism
in Nielsen toward class arbitration is relevant to both parts of the test, or
only the first. The Nielsen and Varela decisions undoubtedly contributed
to the discussion of whether arbitrators should permit class arbitration, but
did it also bear on when they should decide the question?
Logically, it seems that Sappington more closely adheres to the
weight of authority. As mentioned, an overwhelming majority of circuit
courts have held that incorporation of the AAA rules delegates matters of
bilateral arbitrability to the arbitrator. Chesapeake refused to extend this
precedent to class arbitration because of the harsh consequences of class
proceedings. Obviously, these consequences tend to bear on what the
parties reasonably understood the contract to mean—what they “clearly and
unmistakably” intended—but is it reasonable to withhold certain matters of
arbitrability where the plain language draws no such lines? Considering
the fact that the AAA rules provide for class arbitration, this seems like a
contrived effort by defendants to take only the good without the bad. In a
world where cross-referencing a separate set of rules constitutes “clear and
unmistakable” evidence of intent, it cannot reasonably be suggested that
certain rules be followed and others ignored absent any language to that
effect.
A careful review of Nielsen does not disrupt this conclusion.
Throughout the opinion, the Court addressed the ways in which an
arbitrator may answer the class arbitrability question, but never whether
they had authority to do so in the first place. If anything, the Court
acknowledged that parties may implicitly grant arbitrators this authority:
“In certain contexts, it is appropriate to presume that parties that enter into
an arbitration agreement implicitly authorize the arbitrator to adopt such
procedures as are necessary to give effect to the parties’ agreement.”128
128
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2010). But
see id. at 686 (quoting First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)
(noting “that ‘one can understand why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity
on the “who should decide arbitrability” point as giving the arbitrators that power, for doing
so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate’ contrary to their expectations”)).
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Certainly, there are cases and controversies in which the class action
mechanism might be considered a “necessary procedure.” The question
then remains whether incorporating the AAA rules constitutes an
“implicit[] authoriz[ation].”129
In answering this question, a review of the AAA rules is necessary.
The Commercial Rules indicate: “The arbitrator shall have the power to
rule on his or her own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to
the existence, scope, or validity of the arbitration agreement or to the
arbitrability of any claim or counterclaim.”130 Arbitrability is essentially a
question of scope. Is the controversy at hand within the scope of what the
parties agreed to arbitrate? The answer to this question will vary
depending on the language in the contract, but who answers is plainly
indicated in the rule: “the arbitrator shall have th[is] power.”131
The Supplementary Rules are applicable “to any dispute arising out of
an agreement that provides for arbitration . . . on behalf of or against a class
or purported class, and shall supplement any other applicable AAA
rules.”132 The express language of the rule provides for “arbitration on
behalf of or against a class.”133 Under any reasonable interpretation, this
text undeniably brings class arbitration within the contemplation of the
parties. In combination with Commercial Rule 7, it is the logical
conclusion that this constitutes an implicit agreement to grant an arbitrator
the question of class arbitrability.
The Chesapeake court cites no precedent for its “daisy-chain”
concerns134 and there is no reason that, where the source of an extrinsic
writing is apparent, multiple documents may not be linked in this fashion.
With no legal principle that would otherwise preclude the AAA rules from
constituting a valid delegation of the question, the Sappington approach
should prevail.
2. Practical Considerations
Having considered the legal questions presented by Sappington and
Chesapeake, it is helpful to also consider what practical effects may result
129

Id. at 684–85.
Commercial Arbitration Rules and Mediation Procedures 13, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Commercial%20Rules.pdf (last visited Nov. 4, 2018)
(emphasis added).
131
Id.
132
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations 3, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://www.adr.org
/sites/default/files/Supplementary%20Rules%20for%20Class%20Arbitrations.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 4, 2018).
133
Id.
134
See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 761 (3d
Cir. 2016) (quoting only the appellees’ brief).
130
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from their resolution. The Nielsen court, after answering the inquiry before
it, presented a list of “fundamental” differences between bilateral and class
arbitration.135 The court’s discussion of the differences between arbitration
and litigation underscores a foundational disagreement on which this
discussion lies: should proceeding as a class be presumptively available in
arbitration, as it is in court? The Court answers that it should not, since
arbitration is contractual in nature.136 Parties are submitting only to what
they “agree” to in a contract. But, in practice, arbitration really serves as a
substitute for the court system. This issue is highlighted by Justice
Ginsburg in her Nielsen dissent:
Suppose the parties had chosen a New York judicial forum for
resolution of “any dispute” involving a contract for ocean
carriage of goods. There is little question that the designated
court, state or federal, would have authority to conduct claims
like AnimalFeeds’ on a class basis. Why should the class-action
prospect vanish when the “any dispute” clause is contained in an
arbitration agreement?137
While the Court’s insistence that arbitration agreements be put on “equal
footing” with any other contract is logical, it is undermined by its refusal to
acknowledge that arbitral relief is not given the same equality.138
135

A portion of the opinion is reproduced below to demonstrate the Court’s fervency on
this point:
Consider just some of the fundamental changes brought about by the shift
from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration. An arbitrator chosen
according to an agreed-upon procedure no longer resolves a single dispute
between the parties to a single agreement, but instead resolves many disputes
between hundreds or perhaps even thousands of parties. Under the Class
Rules, “the presumption of privacy and confidentiality” that applies in many
bilateral arbitrations “shall not apply in class arbitrations,” thus potentially
frustrating the parties’ assumptions when they agreed to arbitrate. The
arbitrator’s award no longer purports to bind just the parties to a single
arbitration agreement, but adjudicates the rights of absent parties as well.
And the commercial stakes of class-action arbitration are comparable to those
of class-action litigation, even though the scope of judicial review is much
more limited. We think that the differences between bilateral and classaction arbitration are too great for arbitrators to presume, consistent with
their limited powers under the FAA, that the parties’ mere silence on the
issue of class-action arbitration constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in
class proceedings.
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1776 (2010) (citations
omitted).
136
“The Court ties the requirement of affirmative authorization to the basic precept that
arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1782 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).
137
Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783.
138
For further discussion of the not-so-equal footing on which American Arbitration has
been placed, see Richard Frankel, Corporate Hostility to Arbitration, 50 SETON HALL L.
REV. 707, 737 (2020).
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The obvious issue with mandatory arbitration agreements, ignored by
modern contract law, is that, in many cases, the “agreement” is no more
than a legal fiction.139 In its endeavor to ensure that voluntary agreements
are legally binding, modern contract law assumes that contractual
obligations are voluntarily entered into by informed participants.140 But
this assumption is made on shaky grounds and, because of it, mechanisms
like the class action stand to be eliminated in many circumstances. Recall
the paradox created by Chesapeake: the silent class action waiver.141 The
goal of contract law has always been to give force to the intent of the
parties, often at the expense of all else. But when the zeal with which we
protect one party’s understanding of a term results in the judicial
fabrication of another term, we must abandon this logic. To think that the
delegation of an interpretation question could result in a silent waiver of
rights is mind boggling, and yet this is the result that Chesapeake yields.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ELIMINATING THE CLASS ACTION MECHANISM
There is much literature on the reasons why class actions benefit
plaintiffs and those with limited bargaining power,142 but it is entirely
possible that the mechanism stands to protect businesses as well. Consider
the history of our country’s “race to the bottom” during the New Deal era.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, businesses successfully raised
federalism-based constitutional challenges to each piece of legislation
seeking to deal with the pervasive, abhorrent workforce conditions.143 The
federal government contended that state legislation was ineffective at
achieving minimum wage and maximum hour restrictions because
employers would simply flee to another state with more favorable laws as
soon as one passed.144 The result forced employers to compete for the
lowest possible personnel costs or go out of business. With no federally
enacted “floor” on working standards, it created a “race to the bottom.”
Ultimately, the government prevailed, creating a set of minimum
standards,145 but businesses still have little incentive to go beyond them.
139

See, e.g., Danielle Kie Hart, Contract Law Now—Reality Meets Legal Fictions, 41
BALTIMORE L. REV. 1 (2011); Matt Meinel, Comment, Requiring Mutual Assent in the 21st
Century: How to Modify Wrap Contracts to Reflect Consumer’s Reality, 18 N.C.J.L. &
TECH. 180 (2016), http://ncjolt.org/requiring-mutual-assent-21st-century-modify-wrapcontracts-reflect-consumers-reality/.
140
Hart, supra note 139, at 4.
141
See supra Part III.A.
142
See, e.g., COLLECTIVE ACTIONS: ENHANCING ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND RECONCILING
MULTILAYER INTERESTS?, (eds. Stefan Wrbka, et al., Cambridge University Press, 2012).
143
See, e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 550–51
(1935).
144
See id. at 549.
145
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 45–47 (1937).
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The class action mechanism allows the population at large to participate in
this process of determining where lines should be drawn by allowing
individuals to band together over small injustices. Businesses are therefore
tasked with responding not only to regulation, but to customers and
employees. While these victories are often small for each individual
plaintiff, the real winner is the market at large.
Take, for example, a class action against McCormick. The case
involved a small change to the packaging of McCormick pepper tins.146
McCormick faced a class action lawsuit for reducing the amount of pepper
sold in their four ounce tin to three ounces.147 Under today’s commercial
standards, packaging may use air only to protect the goods (such as in bags
of chips) or some other practical purpose, not simply to give the impression
that there is more product within.148 McCormick moved to dismiss, but the
case survived.149
At first blush, it is hard to imagine a smaller injustice than being
fooled into buying one ounce less pepper than you expected. But while the
harm to the individual is very small, what about McCormick’s competitors?
How many billions of ounces of pepper does McCormick sell a year?150
Assuming individuals continue to use the same amount of pepper,
regardless of the empty space inside, the repackaging equates to a raw 25%
profit gain. But for class actions like this one, competitors would have
little choice other than to engage in similar practices to keep up. While
class actions routinely deal blows to individual market participants, their
value as a check on unfair competition is vital to the health of the market.
It requires no leap of logic to see how this principle could apply in
consumer and employment contracts. Without the availability of class
actions, it is possible that a “race to the bottom” situation could arise once
again.

146

Jacob Goldstein, Too Much Empty Space in Pepper Tin Prompts Class-Action
Lawsuit, NPR (Apr. 20, 2016, 5:15 AM), https://www.npr.org/2016/04/20/474935457/plane
t-money-class-action-lawsuit.
147
See In re McCormick & Co., Inc., Pepper Prods. Mktg. & Sale Practices Litig., 215
F. Supp. 3d 51, 56 (D.D.C. 2016).
148
Id. at 60.
149
Tamara Burns, McCormick Attempts to Sidestep Pepper False Ad Lawsuit, TOP
CLASS ACTIONS (July 22, 2016), https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuitnews/340441-mccormick-attempts-sidestep-pepper-false-ad-lawsuit/.
150
McCormick has projected $5 billion in sales in 2019. Lorraine Mirabella,
McCormick Expects to Hit $5 Billion in Sales by 2019, BALTIMORE SUN (Apr. 4, 2017,
11:06
AM),
https://www.baltimoresun.com/business/bs-bz-mccormick-investor-day20170404-story.html. Notably, the advertisement of its new plastic packaging makes no
mention of its quantity reduction.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Class Action and Arbitration mechanisms have been set against
one another by American jurisprudence. As the use of arbitration
agreements expands, the availability of class actions diminishes. The
Supreme Court has determined that the congressional intent of the FAA to
give force to arbitration agreements is paramount, and neither state law nor
federal statutes have managed to offset this reality.151 Since Concepcion,
the Court has taken the stance that a party’s interest in proceeding
collectively cannot override the existing “national policy favoring
arbitration.”152 Extensions of Concepcion have indicated that it makes no
difference that statutory rights are impacted,153 and that agreements need
not make express mention of the class mechanism to waive it.154
The Court has also expressed great skepticism in Nielsen and
Concepcion that class proceedings should ever take place in an arbitral
setting.155 Except where parties grant the question of class arbitrability to
an entity other than the judiciary, it has become extremely unlikely that
such proceedings will occur. This reality has thrust weight upon a circuit
split concerning when an arbitrator may decide questions of class
arbitrability.156 The narrow issue, presented by the Chesapeake-Sappington
circuit split, appears to be no more than a simple matter of contract
interpretation. But its effect on the class action mechanism is enormous.
Following the Chesapeake approach, a paradoxical ‘silent class action
waiver’ results, whereupon parties may waive their right to a class action
by signing a contract making no mention of class proceedings. By contrast,
the Sappington approach preserves an already narrow avenue to class
actions.
Regardless of how the Chesapeake-Sappington circuit split is
resolved, the class mechanism is in danger of extinction in the consumer
and employment setting. This is obviously harmful to would-be plaintiffs,
as they lose a significant source of power to collectively influence the way
businesses conduct activities. But the market itself stands to suffer as well.
Our nation’s history makes plain the dangers of an entirely unregulated
151
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018); Italian Colors Rest. v.
Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2309 (2013); AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. 333, 343 (2011).
152
See Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006).
153
See Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312.
154
See generally Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1617–18.
155
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 347–48; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1775–76 (2010).
156
See Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746, 755–56
(3d Cir. 2016); Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC v. Sappington, 884 F.3d 392, 398 (2d Cir.
2018).
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market. Class actions are one of several necessary checks on businesses
that prevent competitors from being forced to decide between copying less
scrupulous practices or going out of business. The future of the class
action mechanism in other contexts remains uncertain. But unless our
jurisprudence changes course, it is entirely possible that we will face yet
another economic downturn once arbitration extinguishes the class action
mechanism for consumers and employees altogether.

